This paper investigates the associations between three characteristics of microfinance institutions (regulation, international and founder management) and their associated board structure (size, independence, and diversity). The microfinance industry is unique in terms of its newness, diverse organizational status, with for-profits and non-profits, its high level of international influence and its social mission, commonly focusing on female and poor. We therefore find it necessary to examine whether these unique characteristics determine how boards in the microfinance industry are structured. We are guided by agency and resource dependence theories, as we test these associations using a panel data set of 63 organizations and 465 board members from three East Africa countries. We find that the presence of regulations and international influence to be significantly associated with larger boards while that of founder management to be associated with less board independence. We further evidence a higher level of board gender diversity in microfinance organizations which are managed by founders and those with international influence.
INTRODUCTION
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) offer financial services to poor people. Access to financial services is provided to help poor people mitigate risks, build their assets, improve their income, and furthermore contribute to development of the focal community (Cull et al., 2009 ). The building of better governance mechanisms for MFIs is high on the policy agenda of many developing countries (Labie & Mersland, 2009) . It is suggested that better governance is among the most important pillars for MFIs to sustainably offer financial services to the poor (Hartaska & Mersland, 2009 ). Boards of directors provide an internal governance mechanism (versus the external governance from shareholders and other external stakeholders) that is particular important in order to oversee and advise the organization's managers (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) .
For board members to efficiently oversee and advise, they need to have a structure that supports such activities (Jackling & Johl, 2009; Pearce & Zahra, 1992) . However, little is known about MFIs' boards and what determines their structure. This study addresses this research gap by examining the relationship between MFIs unique characteristics and their board structure. We therefore ask: What determines the board structure of an MFI?
The unique characteristics of MFIs relates to a number of aspects. First, most MFIs are characterized by their combining commercial and social goals (Batilana & Dorado, 2010) . These organizations typically build on a novel approach to the provision of loans, utilizing regular banking principles, while at the same time targeting social goals. These dual objectives have brought the attention of international aid agencies and philanthropically investors (Mersland, Randøy & Strøm, 2011) . Second, the international affiliation of MFIs provides another unique characteristic for the industry. Using an analogy from the international business literature e.g., (Morck & Yeung, 1991; Tallman & Li, 1996) , we argue that internationalization of MFI leads to better organizational results. This was also partly supported by (Mersland et al., 2011) . For example (Mersland et al., 2011) reports more than 51% of MFIs in their 73-country dataset have a relationship with an international capital provider (subsidized debt). Third, MFIs vary in ownership forms with some operate as either regulated shareholders-owned with a profit motive, while others operate as unregulated non-profit MFIs (Mersland & Strøm, 2008) . Lastly, the microfinance industry is young and to a large extend still managed by its founders. For example, in our East African data set 54% of all CEOs were also the historical founder of the MFIs. We suggest that MFI's board structure is partly determined by these unique characteristics of the industry. Steier (1998) note that board structure in general is supposed to be set in a way that supports the unique nature of the industry. In the context of the microfinance industry, (Conger, Finegold & Lawler, 1999) , provide guidelines on desirable board composition, members' representation and the size of MFI boards. The authors suggest MFI boards to be composed of a mixture of members with different skills, especially related to expertise on social and financial issues. Hartarska, (2005) further suggest that MFI board size should be small enough to avoid free riding problem. Boards are also required to be structured in a way that they are able to accomplish their main roles (CMEF, 2005) . Campion and Frankiewicz, (1999) further suggest five roles that MFIs board should fulfill: act as a boundary spanner; provides a reputational referent; attracts and mobilizes resources and assists in identifying the MFI's core mission. These roles can be integrated into two major roles of MFIs boards: monitoring and advising CEOs on various matters (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) . These roles are grounded on agency and resource dependency theories (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) . The theories suggest that the ability of board to effectively practice its roles depend on how the board is structured and composed (Boone, 2007) .
In this study we examine the determinants of board structure in East African MFIs (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda). We find this specifically interesting to analyze for two reasons. First, Africa is recognized as the least developed continent in terms of microfinance development, but it has the biggest growth potential market for microfinance (CGAP, 2009) . In Africa, East Africa is evidenced to be the most microfinance developed region (CGAP 2010) . For example (CGAP, 2010) reports 30% of borrowers in Africa are from the East African region. Second, with a significant influence from international donors and capital providers in East Africa, we expect that this push MFIs towards an effective governance and board structure. Since microfinance in East Africa is somewhat developed and there is more international influence comparing to other African regions, we find it particularly interesting to analyze how governance and specifically boards are structured in this region.
We examine three characteristics of MFIs: regulatory status, international influence and founder management. We test the associations between these characteristics and three dimensions of board structure: board size, board independence and board gender diversity.
Hypotheses were tested using a panel data that was obtained through a survey conducted by researchers between December, 2009 and July, 2010 We analyzed our data using a mixture of analytical procedures. First, we performed single measures of each board structure variable in relation to MFI variables using random effects estimations. Second, we perform joint estimations using seemingly unrelated (SUR) regression analysis in order to consider possible combined effects among the board structure variables.
Third, we addressed possible endogeneity problems by using a two stage least square regressions (SLS) with instrumental variables. Main instruments used for endogenous variables were whether the MFI was internationally initiated and MFI size.
Our results indicate that MFIs' board structure is indeed determined by MFIs unique characteristics. In terms of board size, we evidence large board size to be determined by whether the MFI is; regulated or exposed to international influences. These findings are in line with resource dependency theory, that strong stakeholders have the power to be added to the board in order to provide resources to the MFI. Furthermore, this is a way for such stakeholders to reduce agency costs. On the other hand, we evidence that founder managed MFIs to be associated with small boards-as such highly internally motivated founders reduce agency costs of monitoring.
This confirms literature on founder managed organizations that they have small boards that they are manageable and controllable (Certo, Covin, Daily & Dalton, 2001) . Results further indicate that MFIs which have less board independence are those that are part of international networks and are managed by founders. Our results suggest that the typical East African MFI is at a stage of development where resource through insider board members is more important than the potentially better outsider monitoring that comes with more board independence. We further show that board gender diversity is determined by MFI characteristics. We specifically evidence this for MFIs with international networks and founder managed. This is in line with a resource access argument that diversity bring in variety of resources to organizations (Terjesen, Sealy & Singh, 2009 ). This paper contributes to the literature by showing how key MFI characteristics produce variation in board structures in MFIs in Africa. Resource dependency theorists highlight the importance of resources access to organizations (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer, 1973) , and we show this in the context of the microfinance industry. We also draw from agency theory by showing how the various MFI characteristics affect incentives and the potential for monitoringand the subsequent need for a certain board structure. Furthermore, variation in monitoring needs depends on characteristics such as MFI age and size. MFIs, of which most are small and young, have the greatest need for resources access. However, as they grow they may opt for a structure that is better for monitoring, for example by the means of more board independence. To our knowledge, this is among the first study that looks at the determinants of boards in MFIs. We see that this paper provides a contribution in three areas; first as it relates to boards and governance in MFIs, second as it relates to the role of boards in non-profit organizations/mission driven organizations, and third, as the paper relates to corporate governance in emerging markets.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents a brief background of microfinance in East Africa. Next section presents theory, literature and hypotheses developed for the study.
We then elaborate on data and methods used. Next we present and discuss results followed by a section presenting contributions and conclusion.
MICROFINANCE IN EAST AFRICA
The East African countries chosen for this study are Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. These counties represent significant similarities on legal and regulatory regimes (LaPorta, Lopez, Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) but they are heterogeneous in terms of the development of the national microfinance industry. This combination of cross-country institutional similarity with industry variations provides East Africa a suitable environment for microfinance research (particularly in relation to other English common law countries).
The region is recognized as the most microfinance developed region in Africa. Microfinance operations in East Africa officially started in 1990s (Olomi, 2008; Randhawa & Gallardo, 2003) , but there were microfinance related activities before that. (Mersland & Strøm, 2008) . However, we do not include cooperatives in this study, as such institutions have a vastly different ownership and governance structures (Hartarska, 2005) .
Another interesting characteristic of MFIs in East Africa is the existence of both domestically and internationally funded MFIs. MFIs with international partners and/or participants in international networks have access to international funding and/or technical assistance in various areas. Commonly, fund providers influence governance of MFIs. For example, some funders have specifications on how the board of a MFI should be, before they provide funding (CGAP, 2008) . Since the region has had extensive funding and international attention, one may expect that the governance structure of MFIs in this region to be more "developed" and even potentially more efficient than in regions with less such pressure.
The level of government regulations in East Africa is also relatively extensive in relation to other regions (particularly in Africa) and this again makes regional MFIs particularly interesting.
Again, we make the argument that this adds to the pressure for an efficient governance structure. of MFIs worldwide are managed by founders. The corresponding number in our data is 54%.
Unregulated non-profit MFIs in East Africa are a mixture of small and large in sizes; also with variation in terms of some local and some international founders. Locally founded NPOs are in most cases managed by local founders, and since they are unregulated, they have much influence on deciding who should be on the board (Sabana, 2006 Mersland et al. (2011) . 
LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES

Dimensions of Board Structure
This study focuses on factors determining board structure. Based on past research on board structure (Jackling & Johl, 2009; Linck, Netter & Yang, 2008; Pearce & Zahra, 1992) and boards in microfinance specifically (CMEF, 2005; Conger et al., 1999; Mersland & Strøm, 2009 ), we chose to address three dimensions of board structure: board size, board independence and board diversity.
Board size is an important board structure variable because past research indicate that board size effect boards' effectiveness. According to agency theory, small boards operate more effectively than large boards because of lower coordination costs and less free-rider problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Yermack, 1996) . For instance, Lipton and Lorsch, (1992) argue that "when a board has more than ten members it becomes more difficult for them all to express their ideas and opinions." Similarly, (Jensen, 1993) conjectures that "keeping boards small can help improve their performance. This idea is consistent with the more general view that larger boards may be less participative, less cohesive, and less able to reach consensus. On the other hand, resource dependence scholars suggest that larger boards are associated with higher levels of organizational performance (Hillman, et al., 2009; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) . In this view, board size is a measure of an organization's ability to form environmental links to secure resources.
With different expertise, CEOs are able to get better advice and resources from large boards (Lorsch & Maclver, 1989) . A larger board may offer an exceptional level of high quality advice and counsel to a CEO.
With the nature of the microfinance industry, we argue, we see the same kind of trade-off between monitoring and resource access. A large board may enhance MFI resources access while being weaker at monitoring (particularly the CEO). Microfinance policy papers advocate for bigger enough boards to provide better monitoring and resources to managers (CMEF, 2005; Sabana, 2006) . Hartarska and Mersland, (2009) studied which governance mechanisms promote efficiency in MFIs. Their results indicate that there is some benefit to a larger board, but this effect reverses after a certain size. They argue, the results are consistent with the literature on boards in banks and non-profits, for which boards are found to be larger than conventional boards. Their results are also consistent with the idea that excessively large boards may suffer from free-riding. These studies provide evidence that MFIs can benefit from having large boards but there is an optimal board size. We take the perspective that the choice of board size is governed by the trade-off between the aggregate information that large boards possess and the increased costs of decision making associated with them.
Board independence is an important board structure variable as it determines how independent from management the board is. Jensen, (1993) argues that because inside board members are likely to be ineffective in monitoring and evaluating the CEO, the only inside member on the board should be the CEO. Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) develop a bargaining model in which the board's independence as a monitor evolves as a function of the bargaining power of the CEO and the board. Raheja (2005) takes into account both the monitoring and advising roles of the board, and finds that outsider dominated boards are of greater value in organizations. On the other hand, Harris and Raviv (2008) demonstrate that when insiders have important information relative to outsiders, insider-controlled boards are preferred. Inside board members have been found to provide several benefits to organizations they serve. Baysinger, et al., (1991) , for example, found a positive and significant relationship between inside board members and expenditures for research and development of organizations. Insiders can contribute to boardroom discussions in ways outside directors cannot because the former have direct knowledge of organization operations and capabilities (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990 ).
In the young and entrepreneurial industry like microfinance, various stakeholders value clarity of strategic direction (Lapenu & Pierret, 2005) . Inside board members, due to their detailed organizational specific knowledge, are likely to be superior to outside directors in assisting CEOs with defining and maintaining a clear strategic focus for their organizations (Dallas, 1996) . Also, MFIs could benefit from a more independent board through not only better monitoring, but also variety of resources that could be brought by outsiders (Chen, 2011; CMEF, 2005) . Outsiders are often valued for their ability to monitor and control management (Johnson et al. 1996) . This control function might be less important to young organizations -like MFIsthan among more mature firms (Pearce & Zahra, 1992) . But as MFIs or other organizations grow old, they require boards that are better at monitoring. As one MFI CEO puts it; "Four years ago, the Board's role was largely advisory. Now, the stakeholders expect it to take a more active role, especially in monitoring and risk control. We need to draw more on the specialized expertise of the outside members" (CMEF, 2005) . It then appears that MFIs with more independent (less independent) boards benefit more (less) from monitoring than from resource access.
Diversity within boards is advocated to be an important board structure element (Erhardt, Werbel & Shrader, 2003; Strøm, D'Espallier & Mersland, 2010; Terjesen et al., 2009 ). We focus on board gender diversity in terms of female board members -which has also recently been done in the general finance literature (Adams & Ferreira, 2009 ). Burgess and Tharenou (2002) list numerous arguments for the recruitment of female board members: a) increased diversity of opinions in the board room b) influence on strategic decision making and leadership styles of the organization, c) improving organizational image with stakeholder groups and d) ensuring better board room behavior. Female board members further contribute an independent view to the board and demonstrate how one female member's intervention can change the strategic direction of an organization (Selby, 2000) . A study by Daily, Certo & Dalton (1999) , reports that female board members have made significant progress in terms of assuming seats on boards. Bilimoria (2000) reports that even though the number of female board members is increasing, few organizations actively recruit females, and there is still a common gender bias, stereotyping and tokenism on boards. Miller and Triana (2009) studied demographic diversity among fortune 500 organizations in US. They found that organizations with female on boards have higher rate of innovation. Women also contribute to governance and reduce CEO dominance due to their power sharing style. Adams and Fereira (2009) for example, show that female board members in the US have a significant impact on boards' monitoring ability. They conclude that genderdiverse boards allocate more effort to monitoring the CEO.
Microfinance and a female focus are intrinsically linked. The objective of the Microcredit Summit Campaign, which plays a central role in the promotion of microfinance, is "to ensure that 175 million of the world's poorest families, especially female, have access to financial and business services (Strøm et al., 2010) . Several MFIs in East Africa for example, are designed and targeting female only. Mersland and Strøm (2009) report, that 73% of the customers in their global dataset are female. From the female customer focus, it appears that there are benefits of having female on boards. Their presence on board would bring not only a gender balanced board but also female will be able to give information on what female customers need (Mersland and Strøm, 2009 ). This was further suggested by (CMEF, 2005) that MFIs boards should be gender balanced in order to benefit from both parts.
Factors influencing board structure
The review above highlights that board size, level of independence and gender diversity can affect board effectiveness. Past corporate governance literature helps us to identify factors that might determine the choice of board structure (Coles, Daniel & Naveen, 2008; Lehn, Patro & Zhao, 2009) . Factors that have widely been studied are organization size (Alonso, Palenzuela & Merino, 2009; Linck et al., 2008) , organizational age, product complexity (Coles et al., 2008; Markarian & Parbonetti, 2007) and leverage (Pearce & Zahra, 1992) . Since these factors are generic and focused on corporate organizations, we chose to specifically focus on MFIs unique factors that according to literature, we argue, contribute to the way MFIs boards are structured.
We specifically focus on three factors: regulatory status, international influence and founder management.
Effect of Regulatory Status
The fact that MFIs can both be regulated or unregulated is one unique characteristic of this industry. Regulated MFIs are required to have defined shareholders (which non-profits do not have) and they are regulated by central banking authorities. Regulated MFIs operate on a forprofit basis and they vary in terms of types (CMEF, 2005) . Some are registered as banks while others are registered as non-bank financial institutions. Unregulated MFIs operate on a non-profit basis and they are registered as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Mersland, 2009b) . The difference between the two is that regulated MFIs are allowed to offer more services than unregulated MFI-typically deposit taking.
Corporate finance literature evidences that banks have larger boards than other organizations (Adams & Mehran, 2003 , 2008 . This is due to shareholders who, according to agency theory, prefer to sit on boards in order to protect their interests. On the other hand, literature on nonprofit organizations evidence similarly at nonprofit boards are large comparing to other conventional boards, but small compared to banks (Alonso et al., 2006; Hartaska, 2005) . This is because NGOs are ownerless, and they have many stakeholders involved that prefer to be represented on the boards. For example, the average board size of corporate bank board was 18 members (Adams & Mehran, 2003) , while that on NPO study was 11 members (Alonso et al. 2009 ). Both boards are large comparing to common corporate governance recommendations of eight board members (Jensen, 2003) . Comparing regulated MFIs with unregulated MFIs, we expect to see larger boards in regulated MFIs. However, we argue that MFI CEOs are able to benefit from resources provided by large boards, at a cost of being less monitored. Therefore:
Hypothesis 1a: There is a positive relationship between regulated MFIs and board size.
Regulated MFIs have greater flexibility on leveraging and seeking funding from various sources, then unregulated MFIs. Different funding sources bring in various funders who need to monitor the usage of their funds (Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007) . Regulated MFIs are required by law to have independent board members with prescribed skills. In East Africa for example, the law prescribes that at least 75% of board members should not be current employees of the organization (Bank of Tanzania, 2005). Adams and Fereira (2003) studied US corporate organizations and report that banks have more independent board members than other organizations. Adams and Mehran (2008) examined banks boards in the US and show banks are dominated by outsiders. This suggest that for regulated MFIs, as they attract for outside funding and complying to regulatory requirements, would opt for more independent boards. Thus: 
International Influences
There is significant international influence in the microfinance industry. These influences come in various forms such as international funding providers, international knowledge transfers and international networks. For example, (Mersland et al., 2011) report 38% of microbanks in their global dataset were internationally initiated. In addition, (CGAP, 2010) reports that East Africa is the leading region with international influence in terms of funding and initiators. International business research shows that internationalization of for-profit firms tends to produce organizations with better performance (Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003; Riahi-Belkaoui, 1998) . This is contributed through among others, provision of resources from international partners and/or better governance mechanisms. Similarly, Sanders and Carpenter, (1998) suggests that international influence is a way of strengthening interdependencies among organizations. We suggest that this means that MFIs with international influences are more likely to have larger boards -as this facilitates the need for more resources. Thus:
Hypothesis 2a: There is a positive relationship between MFIs with international influence and board size
The typical international partner in the microfinance industry is large international NGOs such as CGAP, FINCA international, Oiko Credit, Accion international, BRAC international and so forth (CGAP, 2008; Rhyne, 2005) . Most of these partners play roles in initiating and owning MFIs.
They also contribute in selecting who should sit on boards. As mentioned earlier, it is common to find same people sitting on various boards in several countries. These board members are insiders as they are affiliated with the MFI. The governance literature further, asserts that insiders are beholden to a CEO and may interfere with vigilant monitoring. However, Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) argued that the use of insiders on for-profit corporate board may positively affect its ability process complex information and to make appropriate strategic decisions. In this case, organizations with international influence possess unique information of which they need to share within the board (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998) . It is further argued that, the more boards have access to information (information supply and processing), the more informed will be their decisions (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998) . We assert that an MFI with international influence will largely influences the information-processing demands placed on it through having a less independent board. Therefore:
Hypothesis 2b: There is a negative relationship between MFIs with international influence and MFI board independence
Most international microfinance partners have a social driven mission of supporting MFIs to reach women and the poor (Rhyne, 2005) . Furthermore, since most international supporters of microfinance come from the developed world, they value the importance of gender balanced boards as advocated by the corporate literature. For example, (CMEP, 2005) advocated for a gender balanced boards of MFIs. In addition, (Mersland et al., 2011) find international influence to positively influence social results of MFIs of which among them is to serve female customers.
The authors argue that international partners are more driven with social motivations, and this we argue, could lead to the promoting of more female on boards. Therefore:
Hypothesis 2c: There is a positive relationship between MFIs with international influence and board gender diversity.
Founder Management
Anecdotal evidence, such as the case of Muhammed Yunus and the Grameen Bank-indicates that MFIs founder CEOs are critically important organizational players in MFIs. The importance of the founders can be due to the relatively newness of the industry. Since the industry is young, founders are around and typically exert significant influence (Alonso et al., 2009) . We argue that founder CEOs have a tendency of treating the organization as their "baby" and want to hold on to and control it as long as possible. Corporate research shows that founder CEOs have different agency issues and they have influence over the choice of board structure (Wasserman, 2003) . This is due to both their formal position and their history with the organization. Wasserman (2003) suggest that founder CEOs and co-founders exert power through board sets and over strategic decision making. Agency theory advocate for small boards since they typically are better CEOs monitors (Yermack, 1996) . Increased monitoring might not be in the interest of founder CEOs, but rather they would opt for small boards in order to have greater control of the board's decision making (Daily & Dalton, 1993) . Furthermore, corporate literature evidence that founder managed for-profit organizations are associated with small boards (Certo, Covin, Daily & Dalton, 2001b) . Based on the arguments above, we suggest that founder CEOs do not want to lose influence and thus opt for small boards. Thus:
Hypothesis 3a: There is a negative relationship between founder managed MFIs and board size.
Most pertinent research suggests that inside board members provide an important complement to the founder CEOs (Certo et al., 2001a) . Founder CEOs, as compared to non-founder CEOs, are likely to be less objective in the assessment of their organizations (Cooper et al., 1988) . They believe that inside board members are able to provide an additional source of high-quality, organization-specific information than by outside board members who are less familiar with the organization (Certo et al., 2001) . Literature further suggest that founder CEOs prefer insiders, due to their detailed specific knowledge, and are likely to be superior to outsiders in assisting CEOs with defining and maintaining a clear strategic focus for their organizations (Daily & Dalton, 1993) . Previous studies evidence that founding managed organizations provide special kind of corporate governance that offers lower agency costs and higher performance (James, 1999; Mishra et al., 2001) . Similarly, in microfinance industry, we expect founder CEOs to be more concerned with having board members who have organization specific knowledge that can enhance decisions made. This was also suggested by (CMEF, 2005) where they argue for inside representation on MFIs boards in order to contribute to dual objectives. Thus:
Hypothesis 3b: There is a negative relationship between founder managed MFIs and board independence.
As mentioned earlier, in our data set 54% of the CEOs are founder CEOs. 28% of these founder CEOs are female. As (Johannisson & Huse, 2000) puts it, `it is the CEO, not the shareholders, who recruit board members, when you recruit people, you recruit people in your own image, people you trust and can easily communicate with'. Since this might also be the case with respect to MFIs, we expect to see founder CEOs use their connections and invite people from their network. Adams, (2009) suggested that male board members or CEOs use their connections with female and invite them on boards. This can also be the same with female CEOs who could use their connections with women and invite them on boards. Furthermore, gender balanced boards are evidenced to be beneficial in terms having a positive work environment (Huse & Solberg, 2006) , having more participative boards (Pearce & Zahra, 1991) , and having access to a local knowledge (Adams & Flynn, 2005) . CEO founders can need to benefit from these advantages.
Thus:
Hypothesis 3c: There is a positive relationship between founder managed MFIs and board diversity. MFIs identified and contacted, 49 MFIs (47.6%) responded, and we obtained governance and financial information for available years. Additionally, we used a snowball sampling (Saunders et al., 2003) , whereby after visiting one MFI, the CEO or the interviewed person gave us contacts of another MFI that was, or was not, in our original list. We then visited these MFIs that fit our categorization. In terms of information content, some MFIs in East Africa publish information on governance and audited financial reports on their websites. We visited the available websites to extract available information. To further check the quality of our information -we used the information from these websites to compare with the data obtained from the survey. The above data collection process led to a total of 63 MFIs with demographic information of 465 board members and information of between 2004 and 2009. These MFIs may represent between a third and a quarter of MFIs in the region. However, we recognize that since most of the data was based on MFIs directories, it is possible that some MFIs were left out and that we have sample biasness. We argue that our sample MFIs represents the major and most established players in regional microfinance industry, since they are members of umbrella associations and more visible on the web. Table 2 Table 3 below report definitions and summary statistics of variables and measures used in this study. The average MFI in our sample has 7 board members, with a minimum of 2 and maximum of 14 board members. 36% of all board members are independent which means most of board members are insiders. Out of 465 board members, 127 of them (25%) are female. This provides a preliminary picture that MFIs board are not gender balanced but have higher percent of female board members. 39% percent of MFIs are regulated. 65% of MFIs in this sample have international networks either as funders or for other relationships. Descriptive results also show that 54% MFIs are managed by founders. The average age of MFI is 9 years, but few MFIs are old to 31 years. Few MFIs (27%) are internationally initiated despite the fact that most of them have international networks. In terms of country variables, we report that 34% of the MFIs are from Kenya and 30% from Uganda, remaining being from Tanzania (36%). Table 4 presents correlations between all variables. First, we look at correlations among board structure variables. Since they are all measures of board structure, their correlations are significant. However, since they measure different aspects of board structure, we will run separate regressions for each of the dimensions of board structure. The correlates provide a first simple test of our hypotheses as we see that a number of them are consistent with our hypotheses. For example, regulated MFIs are positively and significantly correlated with board size. We also see that founder CEO is negatively correlated with board size, and board independence, as we hypothesized.
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS
Data
------------------------------------Insert Table 2 about here ------------------------------------
Descriptive Results
------------------------------------Insert Table 3 about here ------------------------------------
As we prepare for multivariate tests, we now turn to the question of multicollinearity among independent variables. However, correlation coefficients among our independent variables are rather low. Kennedy, (2008) holds that correlations need to be above 0.7 to detect multicollinearity among two variables. None of the correlation coefficients are of that magnitude.
However, significant coefficients are a warning signal that multicollinearity problems may arise when all variables are included simultaneously. To reduce this problem, we run regressions with few variables at a time (similar to Strøm et al., 2010) . In addition, since panel data estimation gives more data points, the multi-collinearity problem here is reduced even further (Wooldridge, 2006 ).
------------------------------------Insert Table 4 about here ------------------------------------
FINDINGS
Regression Methods
We first perform single-equation regressions for each board structure variable followed by system regressions that take joint estimations of all dependent variables. Our data consists of a panel of six years and all three dependent variables are continuous in nature. In this case, we can use either fixed effects model or random effects, depending on time invariant of variables. Fixed effects regression is the model to use when one want to control for omitted variables that differ between cases, but are constant over time. It allows the use of changes in the variables over time to estimate the effects of independent variables on the dependent variable, and it gives consistent results (Wooldridge, 2006) . On the other hand, some omitted variables may be constant over time but vary between cases, and others may be fixed between cases but vary over time. To tackle this challenge, one may use random effects in order to take into considerations both effects and to get efficient estimators. To choose whether we can use any of the two models, we run a Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) which tests whether the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator. The results of this test reject the null hypotheses, and therefore we were able to use random effect model with the generalized least square (GLS) estimation methodology.
Next we use system regressions. System estimation is applicable when we have related measures of an underlying true variable that depends upon a set of explanatory variables. Table 4 shows that this is the situation here, among board structure variables. We therefore use panel data estimation with the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) methodology (Greene, 2008 , Mersland, et al., 2011 , a procedure that takes account of possible correlations among the dependent variables. We further perform a Breusch-Pagan test to check the extent to which the residuals in the SUR regression are independent.
A common challenge in corporate governance research is the issue of possible reverse causality. Specifically, we run robustness checks by re-running all models using instrumental variables with a two stage linear regression (SLS) to address this issue. Another methodological concern is the possible omitted unobservable variable that affects both independent and dependent variables (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Adams et al. 2010) . For example, some MFIs are more progressive than others, so they get international networks faster than others. This effect of omitted variables could lead to spurious correlations among independent and dependent variables, and thus we have to control for this possibility. Random effect model is argued to reduce these concerns (Wooldridge, 2006) . Table 5 and 6 report our econometric findings for both random effects (RE) estimations and seemingly unrelated (SUR) estimations, respectively. We use both tables to provide and explain our results. We find support for hypotheses 1a in relation to board size and 1c in relation to board diversity. Regulated MFIs have larger boards than unregulated MFIs. This is in support of what (Adams & Mehran, 2003 , 2008 found for banks in the US. This implies that despite unregulated MFIs typically have a broader set of stakeholders than regulated MFIs, it looks like they need larger boards to assist them with getting better resources access. We also evidence that regulated MFIs are associated with less gender diverse boards. It seems that, gender balanced board is a less concern for regulated MFIs, despite several call on this issue (CMEF, 2005) . Agency theory suggests that small and independent boards are better at monitoring (Wagner III et al., 1998; Yermack, 1996) . But for MFIs, it seems like regulated MFIs prefer to get more resources from larger boards, despite that this also produce less board independent and less board diversity. This we argue is contributed by the nature of regulated MFIs whereby they have defined shareholders who may use their power to be stetted on the board, even at the "expense" of less board independence and less board diversity.
Results and Discussion
We find evidence that international influence affect MFIs board structure. Tables 5 and 6 provide support for hypothesis 2a; that MFIs with international influence have larger boards.
This supports the theoretical argument that large boards provide enhanced resources access (Hillman et al., 2009 ). Specifically for MFIs, when international connections are involved, their aim is to make sure that MFIs have needed resources for survival (Schreiner, 2000) . So they would opt for a larger board that would bring those resources. Results further provide support for hypothesis 2b; that international influence is associated with less independent boards. Again, for resource reasons, that insiders have critical information that is important for MFIs. In line with hypothesis 2c, we evidence that MFIs with international influence have greater gender diversity.
This implies that international sources advocate for gender biased boards and they believe that female on boards bring in values and resources to MFIs or possibly, that this is a policy driven by gender equally policies of governments and investors from the North. Our conclusion as to the international influence on MFI board structure is that, international sources are more concerned on the resource brought in by board members. In fact, there is a stream of literature that supports the inclusion of more insiders on boards, and thus less board independence (Osterloh & Frey, 2005; Wagner III et al., 1998) . These researchers argue that insiders have more knowledge and information from the market which can be useful for the organization (Zahra, 1996) . We suggest that some of the same motivations might apply in the microfinance industry.
We find support for hypotheses 3a and 3b; that founder managed MFIs are associated with smaller boards and less board independence. As Wasserman (2003) noted, Founder CEOs typically hold a board seat (as well as significant influence on board selection) and this gives them power over strategic decision making. Here we argue, founder CEOs opt for small boards because it is easier for them to be accountable to fewer board members, as well as it easier to control decision making within small groups. For example, when CEO have their agenda and they want a board consent, it is easier for the CEO to speak informally to the individual board member when there are few than many. Founder CEOs are also associated with less independence board structure as shown in both tables. For resources reasons, Founder CEOs might believe that inside board members provide additional source of MFI -specific information than outside board members (as suggested in for-profit organizations by (Certo et al., 2001) ). We also argue that founder CEOs prefer less independent boards because it is easier to be accountable to people who are more familiar to you that to less familiar ones. This may also results into CEO control. We also find support that founder managed MFIs are associated with more board gender diversity. This confirms Strøm's et al (2010) assertion that female leadership has an impact on governance of MFIs. There are many female CEO in MFIs and some of these are founder CEOs who would influence board diversity by suggesting female to be on boards.
For example, Strøm et al.(2010) report 27% of CEOs in their global data set to be female which is very close to our figure of 26%. In addition, we argue that since CEOs know that a large proportion of their main customers are female, they would like to see their board composed of female members. The argument is that female board members can have a deeper understanding of female customers' needs (Mersland & Strøm, 2009 ). Table 6 about here
In summary, our results suggest associations between MFI unique characteristics and board structure. We specifically evidence that East African MFIs put less emphasis on the monitoring aspects of board structure (such as small boards and board independence) -as advocated by agency theory. Alternatively, board structure that is better for resource and advice as advocated by resource dependency theory appears to be preferred in this relatively young and entrepreneurial industry. We evidence that board size increase when the MFI is; regulated and is member of an international network. On the other hand, if a MFI is managed by a founder CEOs, its board will be smaller and less independent. These suggest that board selection in MFIs is more driven by resource access than monitoring concerning. This again might be a result of the youngness of the industry. As also evident from the effect of our control variables, we see that age is positively associated with board independence. This means as a MFI grow older, it would tend to attract more independent board members. Since the average ages of MFI in our dataset is 9 years, most are still young and struggle to get access to resources, the recruitment of knowledgeable internal board members is still the norm. We also evidence that board gender diversity is becoming more common in the industry. We see that when MFIs are part of international networks and founder managed; they tend to have more females on boards than otherwise. This further suggests that female board members, similar to female customers, are becoming important in the industry and that calls for more gender balanced board is also gradually implemented.
Estimations that account for endogeneity
As part of robustness checks, we rerun our models by means of instrumental variables (IV) methods. Among three independent variables, we argue that founder management is an exogenous variable. When CEOs are founders, it means they have been there since the MFI begins its operations and thus, the possibility of reverse causality between founder CEO and board structure is low (Adams & Ferreira, 2009) . We further confirm this by testing all independent variables for endogeneity using Durbin-Hu Hausman test. The remaining two variables, regulation status and international influence resulted to be endogenous. To solve this problem, we first hypothesize that MFI size and international initiated could be valid instruments for these endogenous variables. Based on previous literature, it is possible that MFIs which were internationally initiated are the ones able and easily to get more international networks and expand their services. Size in terms of assets is another variable we use as an instrument. Large
MFIs are in a better position to change their status into becoming regulated and secure more funding through debt and shareholding. We test the correctness of these instruments and run a two-stage instrumental variable (SLS) of Durbin-Hu Hausman (Wooldridge, 2006) . Results are presented in table 7 below.
The SLS analysis provides similar results for most of the hypothesized relations. We still find support that regulated MFIs are positively associated with large boards and negatively with board gender diversity and that MFIs with international influence have larger and less independence boards. However, now there isn't a significant association between international influence and board gender diversity, as the case in our previous test shown in Table 5 and 6.
With founder management, the SLS results are closely consistent with previous estimations. This could further support our argument that this variable is exogenous. Overall, we also highlight that our results justify the need to address the three dimensions of MFIs' board structure within one framework.
CONTRIBUTION AND CONCLUSION
This study examines the determinants of board structure in Microfinance Institutions (MFIs). We specifically examine three unique characteristics of MFIs: regulation status, international influence and founder management. Using a sample of 63 East African MFIs, we are able to show the relationship between these characteristics and three dimensions of board structure: board size, board independence and board gender diversity. We used a mixture of analytical procedures in order to get valid and robust results. First, we perform single measure regression of each board structure variable in relation to MFI characteristics, using random effects estimations.
We then perform joint estimations using a seemingly unrelated (SUR) regression analysis. We handle endogeneity problems by using a two stage least square regressions (SLS) with instrumental variables as our robustness checks. Main instruments used for endogenous variables are whether the MFI was internationally initiated and MFI size.
Results show that there are associations between MFI characteristics and board structure. We suggest board selection in this young and entrepreneurial industry (Strøm et al., 2010) appears to be more motivated by a need for resource access and insider knowledge than for outside monitoring. We find that MFIs which are regulated have large boards and are less gender diverse. This supports the argument from the banking literature (Adams & Mehran, 2008) .
Similarly, MFIs that are members of international networks (either in terms of funding and/or technical assistance) have large, diverse and less independence boards. Past research highlight that international partners associate themselves with MFIs in order to provide them with resources such as funding, international experience through technical assistance and advice (Mersland et al., 2011) . Therefore when they have relationships with MFIs, they would want to see their boards satisfy the need for resources. Founder managed MFIs bring similar evidence to the corporate founder CEO literature (Certo et al., 2001) . We evidence that founder managed MFIs are associated with small and less independent boards. This is a result of the control that founder CEOs have. Also, founder CEOs prefer less independent boards because insiders possess organizational specific knowledge which is needed by CEOs in order to have better organization results (Certo et al., 2001 ). Board diversity is becoming common in MFIs. We specifically evidence that MFIs that are part of international networks, and founder managed MFIs, to be positively associated with a high proportion of female board membership. This suggests that MFIs are aware of the important information/knowledge that female board members provide.
From these results, we conclude that, MFI board selection is particularly motivated by resources access. Apparently, MFIs, and ultimately the stakeholders that affect board composition, are less concerned with the board's ability to monitor the CEOs. They want MFIs to get resource access that would enable them survive and serve poor people better.
Organizational and industry specific knowledge that is brought on boards by insider board members appears to be a necessity for MFIs. Board independence, as a good corporate governance mechanism of monitoring, seems to be less of a concern for MFIs selection of board members. This, we argue is explained by the industry youngness and common social mission of microfinance activities.
We contribute to the literature by showing that unique industry determinates affect board structure in the microfinance industry. We apply resource dependence theory (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer, 1973) by showing how unique microfinance characteristics affect board structure. We also apply agency theory to address monitoring aspects of MFI boards. However, apparently not all MFI emphasize a board structure that is supposed to be better for monitoring (particularly of CEO). It seems like small and young MFIs are in more need for resources; and as they grow, they may opt for a board structure that is better for monitoring.
Our study is based in East Africa and within the time frame of 2004 to 2009. Though we expect that the MFI characteristics of this study should be relevant in other parts of the world, we see this as a limitation. There might be some other determinants of board structure that should be considered when the study is conducted globally, for example the nature of the corporate governance environment (such as the legal and accounting requirements), and the level of financial development of the country. Furthermore, the chosen explanatory variables in this study might be considered in more detail. For example, the cultural and institutional distance between the MFI and its international partner/network, the specific background of the CEO founder, the content of regulations, and finally, a more detailed picture of the MFIs customer environment.
However, we leave this for future research and highlight the need for similar studies in other regions. 
